Case law Brussels II Regulation (2201/2003)

Article 40 - 42 of the Brussels II Regulation

ECJ 11 July 2008 'Rinau' (Case C-195/08 PPU, ECR 2008 Page I-05271)

1. Once a non-return decision has been taken and brought to the attention of the court of origin, it is irrelevant, for the purposes of issuing the certificate provided for in Article 42 of the Brussels II Regulation, that that decision has been suspended, overturned, set aside or, in any event, has not become res judicata or has been replaced by a decision ordering return, in so far as the return of the child has not actually taken place. Since no doubt has been expressed as regards the authenticity of that certificate and since it was drawn up in accordance with the standard form set out in Annex IV to the Regulation, opposition to the recognition of the decision ordering return is not permitted and it is for the requested court only to declare the enforceability of the certified decision and to allow the immediate return of the child.

2. Except where the procedure concerns a decision certified pursuant to Articles 11(8) and 40 to 42 of the Brussels II Regulation, any interested party can apply for non-recognition of a judicial decision, even if no application for recognition of the decision has been submitted beforehand.

3. Article 31(1) of the Brussels II Regulation, in so far as it provides that neither the person against whom enforcement is sought, nor the child is, at this stage of the proceedings, entitled to make any submissions on the application, is not applicable to proceedings initiated for non-recognition of a judicial decision if no application for recognition has been lodged beforehand in respect of that decision. In such a situation, the defendant, who is seeking recognition, is entitled to make such submissions.

ECJ 22 December 2010 ‘Barbara Mercredi v Richard Chaffe’ (Case C-497/10 PPU)

1. The concept of ‘habitual residence’, for the purposes of Articles 8 and 10 of the Brussels II Regulation (No 2201/2003) must be interpreted as meaning that such residence corresponds to the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment. To that end, where the situation concerned is that of an infant who has been staying with her mother only a few days in a Member State – other than that of her habitual residence – to which she has been removed, the factors which must be taken into consideration include, first, the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the stay in the territory of that Member State and for the mother’s move to that State and, second, with particular reference to the child’s age, the mother’s geographic and family origins and the family and social connections which the mother and child have with that Member State. It is for the national court to establish the habitual residence of the child, taking account of all the circumstances of fact specific to each individual case. If the application of the abovementioned tests were, in the case in the main proceedings, to lead to the conclusion that the child’s habitual residence cannot be established, which court has jurisdiction would have to be determined on the basis of the criterion of the child’s presence, under Article 13 of the Regulation.

2. Judgments of a court of a Member State which refuse to order the prompt return of a child under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the civil aspects of international child abduction to the jurisdiction of a court of another Member State and which concern parental responsibility for that child have no effect on judgments which have to be delivered in that other Member State in proceedings relating to parental responsibility which were brought earlier and are still pending in that other Member State.