Case law Brussels I Regulation
(44/2001)
Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation
(Art. 22 BR I = Art. 16 BC 1968)
Property rights in immovable property and lease (tenancies)
[Article 22, point 1]
ECJ
28 April 2009 ‘Apostolides v Orams’ (Case
C-420/07)
Article 35(1) of the Brussels I Regulation does
not authorise a court of a Member State to refuse recognition or enforcement
of a judgment given by the courts of another Member State concerning
land situated in an area of the latter State over which its government
does not exercise effective control.
In that connection, Article 22 of the Brussels
I Regulation contains a mandatory and exhaustive list of the grounds
of exclusive international jurisdiction of the Member States. That
Article merely designates the Member State whose courts have “jurisdiction
ratione materiæ”, but does not allocate jurisdiction within
the Member State concerned. It is for each Member State to determine
the organisation of its own courts. Furthermore, the principle prohibiting
the review of the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of
origin, laid down in Article 35(3) of the Brussels I Regulation, prevents
a review of the domestic jurisdiction of the court of the Member State
of origin concerned being conducted in the case in the main proceedings.
Therefore, the forum rei sitæ rule provided for in Article 22(1)
of the Brussels I Regulation concerns the international jurisdiction
of the courts of the Member States and not their domestic jurisdiction.
It follows that where land is situated in the territory of a Member
State and, therefore, that the rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article
22(1) of the Brussels I Regulation has been observed, the fact that
the land is situated in an area of that Member State over which the
government of that State does not exercise effective control may possibly
have an effect on the domestic jurisdiction of the courts of that
Member State, but cannot have any effect for the purposes of that
regulation (see paras 48-52, operative part 2).
ECJ
18 May 2006 ‘Land Oberösterreich v CEZ’ (Case
C-343/04, ECR 2006 p. I-04557)
Article 16(1)(a) of the 1968 Brussels Convention
[Article 22, point 1(a), of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted
as meaning that an action which seeks to prevent a nuisance affecting
or likely to affect land belonging to the applicant, caused by ionising
radiation emanating from a nuclear power station situated on the territory
of a neighbouring State to that in which the land is situated, does
not fall within the scope of that provision. The exclusive jurisdiction
of the courts of the Contracting State [Member State] in which the
property is situated does not encompass all actions concerning rights
in rem in immovable property, but only those which both come within
the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention [the Brussels I Regulation]
and are actions which seek to determine the extent, content, ownership
or possession of immovable property or the existence of other rights
in rem therein and to provide the holders of those rights with protection
for the powers which attach to their interest. By contrast, if the
basis of an action for cessation of a nuisance, possibly preventive
in nature, is the interference with a right in rem in immovable property,
such an action does not constitute a dispute having as its object
rights in rem in immovable property, as the real and immovable nature
of that right is, in this context, of only marginal significance.
Therefore, the real and immovable nature of the right at issue does
not have a decisive influence on the issues to be determined in the
dispute in the main proceedings, which would not have been raised
in substantially different terms if the right whose protection is
sought against the alleged nuisance were of a different type, such
as, for example, the right to physical integrity or a personal right.
Finally the considerations of sound administration
of justice which underlie Article 16(1)(a) [Article 22, point 1(a),
Regulation] are not applicable in such an action and do not, therefore,
preclude such an action from remaining outside the scope of that provision
(see paras 27, 30-31, 34-35, operative part).
ECJ
13 October 2005 ‘Klein v Rhodos Management’ (Case
C-73/04, ECR 2005 p. I-08667)
Article 16(1)(a) of the 1968 Brussels Convention
[Article 22, point 1(a), of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted
as meaning that it does not apply to a club membership contract which,
in return for a membership fee which represents the major part of
the total price, allows members to acquire a right to use on a time-share
basis immovable property of a specified type in a specified location
and provides for the affiliation of members to a service which enables
them to exchange their right of use (see para. 28, operative part).
ECJ
5 April 2001 ‘Gaillard v Chekili’ (Case
C-518/99, ECR 2001 p. I-02771)
An action for rescission of a contract for the sale
of land and consequential damages is not within the scope of the rules
on exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings which have as their object
rights in rem in immovable property under Article 16(1) of the 1968
Brussels Convention [Article 22, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation].
ECJ
27 January 2000 ‘Dansommer v Götz’ (Case
C-8/98, ECR 2000 p. I-00393)
The rule laid down in Article 16(1)(a) of the 1968
Brussels Convention [Article 22, point 1(a) of the Brussels I Regulation],
conferring exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings having as their object
tenancies of immovable property is applicable to an action for damages
for taking poor care of premises and causing damage to accommodation
which a private individual had rented for a few weeks' holiday, even
where the action is not brought directly by the owner of the property
but by a professional tour operator from whom the person in question
had rented the accommodation and who has brought legal proceedings
after being subrogated to the rights of the owner of the property.
The ancillary clauses relating to insurance in the
event of cancellation and to guarantee of repayment of the price paid
by the client, which are contained in the general terms and conditions
of the contract concluded between that organiser and the tenant, and
which do not form the subject of the dispute in the main proceedings,
do not affect the nature of the tenancy as a tenancy of immovable
property within the meaning of that provision of the Convention [Regulation].
ECJ
9 June 1994 ‘Lieber v Göbel’ (Case
C-292/93, ECR 1994 p. I-02535)
A claim for compensation for use of a dwelling after
the annulment of a transfer of ownership is not included in the matters
governed by Article 16(1) of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article
22, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation]. Article 16 [Article 22
Regulation] must not be given a wider interpretation than is required
by its objective, since it results in depriving the parties of the
choice of forum which would otherwise be theirs and, in certain cases,
in their being brought before a court which is not that of any of
them. The fact that the compensation payable is to be calculated according
to the principles governing tenancies does not justify the application
of Article 16(1) [Article 22, point 1, Regulation] to a situation
where no tenancy is involved, since where there is no relationship
of landlord and tenant, which is governed by special legislative provisions,
some of a mandatory nature, of the State where the immovable property
which is the subject of the lease is situated, the reasons, relating
to the complex nature of that relationship and the interest of the
State in which the property is situated in ensuring that those provisions
are complied with, which justify the exclusive jurisdiction conferred
by that provision on the courts of that State in cases concerning
tenancies do not apply.
ECJ
17 May 1994 ‘Webb v Webb’ (Case C-294/92,
ECR 1994 p. I-01717)
In order for Article 16(1) of the 1968 Brussels
Convention [Article 2, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation] to apply,
it is not sufficient that a right in rem in immovable property be
involved in the action or that the action have a link with immovable
property: the action must be based on a right in rem and not on a
right in personam, save in the case of the exception concerning tenancies
of immovable property. It follows that an action for a declaration
that a person holds immovable property as trustee and for an order
requiring that person to execute such documents as should be required
to vest the legal ownership in the plaintiff does not constitute an
action in rem within the meaning of Article 16(1) of the Convention
[Article 22, point 1, of the Regulation].
ECJ
26 February 1992 ‘Hacker v Euro-Relais’ (Case
C-280/90, ECR 1992 p. I-01111)
Article 16(1) of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article
22, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation] is to be interpreted as
not applying to a contract concluded in a Contracting State [Member
State] whereby a business organizing travel with its seat in that
State undertakes to procure for a client domiciled in the same State
the use for several weeks of holiday accommodation not owned by it
in another Contracting State [Member State], and to book the travel
arrangements. A complex contract of that type, which concerns a range
of services provided in return for a lump sum paid by the customer,
is outside the scope within which the exclusive jurisdiction laid
down in Article 16(1) [Article 22, point 1, Regulation] finds its
raison d'être and cannot constitute a "tenancy agreement"
within the meaning of that provision.
ECJ
10 January 1990 'Reichert v Dresdner Bank' (Case C-115/88,
ECR 1990 p. I-00027)
The concept of 'proceedings which have as their
object rights in rem in immovable property', mentioned in Article
16(1 ) of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 22, point 1, of the
Brussels I Regulation], must be given an independent interpretation.
It encompasses only those actions concerning rights in rem in immovable
property which both come within the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention
[the Brussels I Regulation] and are actions which seek to determine
the extent, content, ownership or possession of immovable property
or the existence of other rights in rem therein and to provide the
holders of those rights with the protection of the powers which attach
to their interest. It does not apply to an action whereby a creditor
seeks to have a disposition of a right in rem in immovable property
rendered ineffective as against him on the ground that it was made
in fraud of his rights by his debtor.
ECJ
6 July 1988 'Scherrens v Maenhout' (Case 158/87, ECR
1988 p. 03791)
Article 16(1) of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article
22, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted as
meaning that, in a dispute as to the existence of a lease relating
to immovable property situated in two Contracting States [Member States],
exclusive jurisdiction over the immovable property situated in each
Contracting State [Member State] is, in principle and subject to special
cases in which the particular disposition of the property may necessitate
a different solution, held by the courts of that State.
ECJ
15 January 1985 'Rösler v Rottwinkel' (Case 241/83,
European Court reports 1985 p. 00099)
1. Article 16(1) of the 1968 Brussels Convention
[Article 22, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation] applies to all
lettings of immovable property, even for a short term, and even where
they relate only to the use and occupation of a holiday home.
2. All disputes concerning the obligations of the
landlord or of the tenant under a tenancy, in particular those concerning
the existence of tenancies or the interpretation of the terms thereof,
their duration, the giving up of possession to the landlord, the repairing
of damage caused by the tenant or the recovery of rent and of incidental
charges payable by the tenant, such as charges for the consumption
of water, gas and electricity, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction
conferred by Article 16(1) of the Convention [Article 22, point 1,
of the Regulation] on the courts of the State in which the property
is situated. On the other hand, disputes which are only indirectly
related to the use of the property let, such as those concerning the
loss of holiday enjoyment and travel expenses, do not fall within
that exclusive jurisdiction.
ECJ
15 November 1983 'Duijnstee v Goderbauer' (Case 288/82,
ECR 1983 p. 03663)
Article 19 of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article
25 of the Brussels I Regulation] requires the national court to declare
of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction whenever it finds that
a court of another Contracting State [Member State] has exclusive
jurisdiction under Article 16 of the Convention [Article 22 of the
Regulation], even in an appeal in cassation where the national rules
of procedure limit the court's reviewal to the grounds raised by the
parties.
ECJ
J 14 December 1977 'Sanders v Van der Putte' (Case
73-77, ECR 1977 p. 02383)
The assignment, in the interests of the proper administration
of justice, of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of one Contracting
State [Member State]in accordance with Article 16 of the 1968 Brussels
Convention [Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation] results in depriving
the parties of the choice of the forum which would otherwise be theirs
and, in certain cases, results in their being brought before a court
which is not that of the domicile of any of them. Having regard to
that consideration the provisions of Article 16 [Article 22 Regulation]
must not be given a wider interpretation than is required by their
objective. Therefore, the concept of ‘matters relating to .
. . tenancies of immovable property' within the context of Article
16 of the Convention [Article 22 of the Regulation] must not be interpreted
as including an agreement to rent under a usufructuary lease a retail
business (verpachting van een winkelbedrijf ) carried on in immovable
property rented from a third person by the lessor. The fact that there
is a dispute as to the existence of such an agreement does not affect
the reply given as regards the applicability of Article 16 of the
Convention [Article 22 of the Regulation].
Validity or the dissolution of legal persons (companies,
associations) or the decisions of their organs [Article 22, point 3]
ECJ
2 October 2008 ‘Hassett and Doherty v Health Board’ (Case
C-372/07, ECR 2008 p. I-07403)
Point 2 of Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation
(No 44/2001) is to be interpreted as meaning that proceedings in the
context of which one of the parties alleges that a decision adopted
by an organ of a company has infringed rights that it claims under
that company’s Articles of Association do not concern the validity
of the decisions of the organs of a company within the meaning of
that provision.
In order for point 2 of Article 22 of the Regulation
to apply, it is not sufficient that a legal action involve some link
with a decision adopted by an organ of a company. The essential objective
pursued by the exception to the general rule of jurisdiction established
by that provision, whereby exclusive jurisdiction is attributed to
the courts of the Member State in which a company has its seat, is
one of centralising jurisdiction in order to avoid conflicting judgments
being given as regards the existence of a company or as regards the
validity of the decisions of its organs. If all disputes involving
a decision by an organ of a company were to come within the scope
of that article, that would mean that all legal actions brought against
a company – whether in matters relating to a contract, or to
tort or delict, or any other matter – would almost always come
within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in which
the company has it seat.
Moreover, such an interpretation would make the
exceptional jurisdiction established by point 2 of Article 22 of the
Regulation applicable in the case of disputes which would not give
rise to conflicting judgments as regards the validity of the decisions
of the organs of a company and also in the case of disputes which
do not require any examination of the publication formalities applicable
to a company. Such an interpretation would thus have the effect of
extending the scope of point 2 of Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation
beyond what is required by its objective. It follows that the scope
of application of that provision covers only disputes in which a party
is challenging the validity of a decision of an organ of a company
under the company law applicable or under the provisions governing
the functioning of its organs, as laid down in its Articles of Association
(see paras 19-20, 22-26, operative part).
Registration or validity of patents, trade marks,
designs or similar rights [Article 22, point 4]
ECJ
13 July 2006 ‘Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik’ or 'GAT' (Case
C-4/03, ECR 2006 p. I-06509)
Article 16(4) of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article
22, point 4, of the Brussels I Regulation] is to be interpreted as
meaning that the rule of exclusive jurisdiction laid down therein
concerns all proceedings relating to the registration or validity
of a patent, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of
an action or a plea in objection. First, to allow a court seised of
the main action relating to a patent, such as an action for infringement
or for a declaration that there has been no infringement, to establish,
indirectly, the invalidity of the patent at issue would undermine
the binding nature of the rule of jurisdiction laid down in that article
and would circumvent its mandatory nature. Second, the possibility
which this offers would have the effect of multiplying the heads of
jurisdiction and would be liable to undermine the predictability of
the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Convention [Regulation],
and consequently to undermine the principle of legal certainty, which
is the basis of the Convention [Regulation]. Finally, to allow, within
the scheme of the Convention [Regulation], decisions in which courts
other than those of a State in which a particular patent is issued
rule indirectly on the validity of that patent would also multiply
the risk of conflicting decisions which the Convention [Regulation]
seeks specifically to avoid. (see paras 26-29, 31, operative part).
ECJ
15 November 1983 'Duijnstee v Goderbauer' (Case 288/82,
ECR 1983 p. 03663)
The term 'proceedings concerned with the registration
or validity of patents', contained in Article 16(4) of the 1968 Brussels
Convention [Article 22, point 4, of the Brussels I Regulation], must
be regarded as an independent concept intended to have uniform application
in all the Contracting States [Member States]. The term 'proceedings
concerned with the registration or validity of patents' does not include
a dispute between an employee for whose invention a patent has been
applied for or obtained and his employer, where the dispute relates
to their respective rights in that patent arising out of the contract
of employment.
Enforcement of judgments [Article 22, point 5]
ECJ
26 March 1992 ‘Reichert c.s. v Dresdner Bank’ (Case
C-261/90, ECR 1992 p. I-02149)
Article 16(5) of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article
22, point 5, of the Brussels I Regulation] confers exclusive jurisdiction
on the courts of the place in which the judgment has been or is to
be enforced to deal with proceedings which may arise from recourse
to force, constraint or distraint on movable or immovable property
in order to ensure the effective implementation of judgments. An action
such as the action paulienne, by which the creditor seeks to obtain
the revocation with regard to himself of the transaction whereby the
debtor has effected a disposition in fraud of the creditor's rights
and which therefore seeks to protect whatever security the creditor
may have with a view to a subsequent enforcement of the obligation
of his debtor, is not intended to obtain a decision in such proceedings
and does not therefore come within the scope of that provision.
ECJ
4 July 1985 'Autoteile Service v Malhé' (Case
220/84, ECR 1985 p. 02267)
Applications to oppose enforcement, as provided
for under paragraph 767 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, fall,
as such, within the jurisdiction provision contained in article 16(5)
of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 22, point 5, of the Brussels
I Regulation]; that provision does not, however, make it possible,
in an application to oppose enforcement made to the courts of the
Contracting State [Member State] in which enforcement is to take place,
to plead a set-off between the right whose enforcement is being sought
and a claim over which the courts of that State would have no jurisdiction
if it were raised independently.
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