Case law Brussels I Regulation (44/2001)
Article 18 - 21 of the Brussels I Regulation
ECJ
22 May 2008 ‘Glaxosmithkline v Rouard’ (Case
C-462/06, ECR 2008 Page I-03965) 
The rule of special jurisdiction provided for in Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation cannot be applied to a dispute falling under Section 5 of Chapter II of that Regulation concerning the jurisdiction rules applicable to individual contracts of employment.
It is apparent from Article 18(1) of that Regulation and, moreover, from a literal interpretation of Section 5, supported by the ‘travaux préparatoires’ relating to the Regulation, that the court having jurisdiction in proceedings concerning an individual contract of employment must be designated in accordance with the jurisdiction rules laid down in that Section, rules which, on account of their specific and exhaustive nature, cannot be amended or supplemented by other rules of jurisdiction laid down in that regulation unless specific reference is made thereto in Section 5.
As regards the possibility that only an employee may rely on Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, that would run counter to the wording of both that provision and Section 5 of Chapter II of that Regulation. The transformation by the Community courts of the rules of special jurisdiction, aimed at facilitating sound administration of justice, into rules of unilateral jurisdiction protecting the party deemed to be weaker would go beyond the balance of interests which the Community legislature has established in the law as it currently stands. Furthermore, such an interpretation would be difficult to reconcile with the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the objectives of the regulation and which requires, in particular, that rules of jurisdiction be interpreted in such a way as to be highly predictable (see paras 19-24, 32-33, 35, operative part).
ECJ
10 April 2003 ‘Pugliese v Finmeccanica’ (Case
C-437/00, ECR 2003 p. I-03573)
Article 5, point (1), of the Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that, in a dispute between an employee and a first employer, the place where the employee performs his obligations to a second employer can be regarded as the place where he habitually carries out his work when the first employer, with respect to whom the employee's contractual obligations are suspended, has, at the time of the conclusion of the second contract of employment, an interest in the performance of the service by the employee to the second employer. The existence of such an interest must be determined on a comprehensive basis, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case. When such an interest is lacking on the part of the first employer, Article 5, point (1), of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that the place where the employee carries out his work is the only place of performance of an obligation which can be taken into consideration in order to determine which court has jurisdiction (see paras 26, 28, 30, operative part 1-2).
ECJ
27 February 2002 ‘Weber v Universal Ogden’ (Case
C-37/00, ECR 2002 p. I-02013)
1. Work carried out by an employee on fixed or floating installations positioned on or above the part of the continental shelf adjacent to a Contracting State, in the context of the prospecting and/or exploitation of its natural resources, is to be regarded as work carried out in the territory of that State for the purposes of applying Article 5, point (1), of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Brussels I Regulation](see para. 36, operative part 1 ).
2. Article 5, point (1), of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that where an employee performs the obligations arising under his contract of employment in several Contracting States [Member States] the place where he habitually works, within the meaning of that provision, is the place where, or from which, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, he in fact performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer.
In the case of a contract of employment under which an employee performs for his employer the same activities in more than one Contracting State [Member State], it is necessary, in principle, to take account of the whole of the duration of the employment relationship in order to identify the place where the employee habitually works, within the meaning of Article 5, point (1) [Article 5, point (1), Regulation]. Failing other criteria, that will be the place where the employee has worked the longest. It will only be otherwise if, in light of the facts of the case, the subject-matter of the dispute is more closely connected with a different place of work, which would, in that case, be the relevant place for the purposes of applying Article 5, point (1), of the Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Regulation].
In the event that the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice do not enable the national court to identify the habitual place of work, as referred to in Article 5, point (1), of the Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Regulation], the employee will have the choice of suing his employer either in the courts for the place where the business which engaged him is situated, or in the courts of the Contracting State in whose territory the employer is domiciled.
Moreover, national law applicable to the main dispute has no bearing on the interpretation of the concept of the place where an employee habitually works, within the meaning of Article 5, point (1), of the Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Regulation] (see paras 58, 62, operative part 2-3).
ECJ
9 January 1997 ‘Rutten v Cross Medical Ltd’ (Case
C-383/95, ECR 1997 p. I-00057)
Article 5, point (1), of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that where, in the performance of a contract of employment, an employee carries out his work in several Contracting States [Member States], the place where he habitually carries out his work, within the meaning of that provision, is the place where he has established the effective centre of his working activities. When identifying that place, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the employee spends most of his working time in one of the Contracting States [Member States] in which he has an office where he organizes his activities for his employer and to which he returns after each business trip abroad.
ECJ
13 July 1993 ‘Mulox v Hendrick Geels’ (Case
C-125/92, ECR 1993 p. I-04075)
1. The terms used in the 1968 Brussels Convention [the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted autonomously. Only such an interpretation is capable of ensuring uniform application of the Convention [Regulation], the objectives of which include unification of the rules on jurisdiction of the Contracting States [Member States], so as to avoid as far as possible the multiplication of the bases of jurisdiction in relation to one and the same legal relationship and to reinforce the legal protection available to persons established in the Community by, at the same time, allowing the plaintiff easily to identify the court before which he may bring an action and the defendant reasonably to foresee the court before which he may be sued.
2. In view of the specific nature of contracts of employment, the place of performance of the obligation in question, for the purposes of applying Article 5, point (1), of the Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Regulation] must, in the case of such contracts, be determined by reference not to the applicable national law in accordance with the conflict rules of the court seised but, rather, to uniform criteria laid down by the Court of Justice on the basis of the scheme and the objectives of the Convention. The place of performance is the place where the employee actually carries out the work covered by the contract with his employer.
Where the employee performs his work in more than one Contracting State [Member State], the place of performance of the contractual obligation, within the meaning of that provision, must be defined as the place where or from which the employee discharges principally his obligations towards his employer.
ECJ
15 February 1989 ‘Six Constructions v Humbert’ (Case
32/88, ECR 1989 p. 00341)
Article 5, point (1), of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that, as regards contracts of employment, the obligation to be taken into consideration is the one which characterizes such contracts, in particular the obligation to carry out the agreed work. Where the obligation of the employee to carry out the agreed work was performed and had to be performed outside the territory of the Contracting States [Member States], Article 5, point (1), of the Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Regulation] is not applicable; in such a case jurisdiction is to be determined on the basis of the place of the defendant' s domicile in accordance with Article 2 of the Convention [Article 2 of the Regulation].
ECJ
15 January 1987 'Shenavai v Kreischer' (Case 266/85,
ECR1987 p. 00239)
Whereas in the case of an action based on an obligation under a contract of employment or another contract with the same particularities for work other than on a self-employed basis the relevant obligation for the purpose of determining the place of performance within the meaning of Article 5, point (1), of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Brussels I Regulation] is the obligation which characterizes that contract, the position is different where no such particularities exist, as in the case of most contracts, where the general rule applies that the relevant obligation is that on which the plaintiff's action is based. In a dispute concerning proceedings for the recovery of fees commenced by an architect commissioned to draw up plans for the building of houses, therefore, the obligation to be taken into consideration is the contractual obligation which forms the actual basis of the legal proceedings.
ECJ
26 May 1982 'Ivenel v Schwab' (Case 133/81, ECR 1982
p. 01891)
The obligation to be taken into account for the purposes of the application of article 5, point (1), of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Brussels I Regulation] in the case of claims based on different obligations arising under a contract of employment as a representative binding a worker to an undertaking is the obligation which characterizes the contract.
ECJ
4 March 1982 'Effer v Kantner' (Case 38/81, ECR 1982
p. 008250)
In the cases provided for in Article 5, point (1), of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Brussels I Regulation], the national court's jurisdiction to determine questions relating to a contract includes the power to consider the existence of the constituent parts of the contract itself, since that is indispensable in order to enable the national court in which proceedings are brought to examine whether it has jurisdiction under the Convention [Regulation]. Therefore the plaintiff may invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of the place of performance in accordance with Article 5, point (1), of the Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Regulation], even when the existence of the contract on which the claim is based is in dispute between the parties.
ECJ
6 October 1976 'De Bloos v Bouyer' (Case 14-76)
1. For the purpose of determining the place of performance within the meaning of Article 5 of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5 of the Brussels I Regulation] the obligation to be taken into account is that which corresponds to the contractual right on which the plaintiff 's action is based. In a case where the plaintiff asserts the right to be paid damages or seeks the dissolution of the contract by reason of the wrongful conduct of the other party, the obligation referred to in Article 5, point (1) [Article 5, point (1), Regulation], is still that which arises under the contract and the non-performance of which is relied upon to support such claims.
2. In disputes in which the grantee of an exclusive sales concession charges the grantor with having infringed the exclusive concession, the word 'obligation' contained in Article 5, point (1), of the Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Regulation] on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters refers to the obligation forming the basis of the legal proceedings, namely the contractual obligation of the grantor which corresponds to the contractual right relied upon by the grantee in support of the application.
In disputes concerning the consequences of the infringement by the grantor of a contract conferring an exclusive concession, such as the payment of damages or the dissolution of the contract, the obligation to which reference must be made for the purposes of applying Article 5, point (1), of the Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Brussels I Regulation] is that which the contract imposes on the grantor and the non-performance of which is relied upon by the grantee in support of the application for damages or for the dissolution of the contract.
In the case of actions for the payment of compensation by way of damages, it is for the national court to ascertain whether, under the law applicable to the contract, an independent contractual obligation or an obligation replacing the unperformed contractual obligation is involved.
ECJ
6 October 1976 'Industrie Tessili v Dunlop' (Case
12-76)
The 1968 Brussels Convention [the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted having regard both to its principles and objectives and to its relationship with the Treaty. As regards the question whether the words and concepts used in the Convention [Regulation] must be regarded as having their own independent meaning and as being thus common to all the Member States or as referring to substantive rules of the law applicable in each case under the rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is first brought, the appropriate choice can only be made in respect of each of the provisions of the Convention to ensure that it is fully effective having regard to the objectives of Article 220 of the Treaty. The 'place of performance of the obligation in question' within the meaning of Article 5, point (1), of the Convention [Article 5, point (1), of the Regulation] is to be determined in accordance with the law which governs the obligation in question according to the rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is brought.